The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently made a significant ruling on a case challenging Hawaii’s strict gun laws, but it didn’t come quickly. The case, Yakutake v. Lopez, was first argued back in February 2023, with oral arguments heard in January 2024. Yet, it took over two years for the court to finally issue a decision, a delay not uncommon for the Ninth Circuit, which often seems reluctant to rule against restrictive gun laws favored by states like California and Hawaii.
At the heart of the case were Hawaii’s tight deadlines for purchasing and registering firearms. Under the state’s rules, once someone gets a permit to buy a handgun, they originally had just 10 days to complete the purchase (later extended to 30 days after the lawsuit began). For long guns, permits lasted a year, but handguns faced this much shorter window. Then, after buying the firearm, the owner had a mere five days to take it to a police station for a “safety inspection” and registration. The plaintiff in Yakutake argued that these time limits were unreasonably restrictive and violated the Second Amendment.
On March 14, 2025, a three-judge panel from the Ninth Circuit agreed in a 2-1 decision. They upheld a lower court’s ruling that both the purchase deadline and the registration timeline placed unconstitutional burdens on the right to keep and bear arms. The court reasoned that the Second Amendment protects not just owning firearms but also acquiring them, and Hawaii’s rules made that process too difficult without good justification. For example, the state couldn’t prove that background check information became outdated after 30 days, undermining their argument for the purchase cutoff. Likewise, the five-day registration rule, requiring an in-person police inspection, was seen as overly restrictive.
This decision marks a win for gun rights advocates, though the Ninth Circuit’s slow pace—taking over two years since the case was argued—highlights how these courts can drag their feet, especially when the outcome might favor broader Second Amendment protections. The ruling strikes down key parts of Hawaii’s handgun laws, calling them out as civil rights violations under the Constitution.
Below is a breakdown of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Yakutake v. Lopez (Case No. 21-16756), as detailed in the provided link from Justia, issued on March 14, 2025. This summary is written in my own words based on the content of the ruling, focusing on the key points of the decision regarding Hawaii’s gun purchase permit and registration time limits.
Background of the Case
The case centers on a challenge to two specific provisions of Hawaii’s firearm laws under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 134-2(e). These laws govern the process for legally acquiring and registering handguns:
- Permit Time Limit: After obtaining a permit to acquire a handgun, an individual must complete the purchase within a set period—originally 10 days, later amended to 30 days during the litigation.
- Registration Deadline: After purchasing the handgun, the buyer must physically bring it to a police station for an in-person “safety inspection” and registration within five days.
The plaintiff, Kenneth Yakutake, argued that these time restrictions violated his Second Amendment rights. A federal district court in Hawaii agreed with him, striking down both requirements as unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reviewed the case under the Supreme Court’s framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022), a landmark decision that redefined how Second Amendment challenges are evaluated.
The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling
In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, finding both time limits unconstitutional. The majority opinion was written by Judge Daniel P. Collins, joined by Judge Lawrence VanDyke, with Judge Ronald M. Gould dissenting. Here’s how the court broke it down:
Legal Framework: The Bruen Test
The court applied the two-step test from Bruen:
- Step One: Does the Second Amendment’s plain text cover the regulated conduct? If so, the right is presumptively protected.
- Step Two: Can the government justify the regulation by showing it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation?
Step One: Second Amendment Coverage
The majority held that the Second Amendment protects not only the right to “keep and bear arms” but also the right to acquire them. Hawaii’s laws—limiting the time to buy a handgun after getting a permit and requiring swift registration—directly burden this acquisition process. Thus, the conduct fell within the Second Amendment’s scope, shifting the burden to the state to justify the restrictions.
Step Two: Historical Tradition Analysis
The state had to prove that its time limits aligned with America’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court examined each restriction separately:
- 30-Day Purchase Deadline:
- State’s Argument: Hawaii claimed the short window ensured that background check information remained current, preventing dangerous individuals from acquiring guns if their status changed (e.g., a new criminal conviction).
- Court’s Response: The majority rejected this. The state provided no evidence that background information becomes “stale” after 30 days. Historical laws cited by Hawaii—like 19th-century bans on selling guns to certain groups (e.g., intoxicated persons)—regulated who could buy guns, not when they could buy them after approval. No historical precedent supported a rigid post-permit purchase deadline. Thus, the 30-day limit was an unjustified burden on Second Amendment rights.
- Five-Day Registration and Inspection Requirement:
- State’s Argument: Hawaii argued that requiring in-person inspection and registration within five days helped track firearms and ensure public safety.
- Court’s Response: The majority found this requirement even less defensible. While some early American laws required militia members to present weapons for inspection, those were tied to militia service, not private ownership. Hawaii’s broad rule applied to all handgun buyers and lacked a historical analog. The court noted that the state failed to show why five days was necessary or how it aligned with historical practices. The in-person inspection mandate, in particular, added an extra layer of burden without clear justification rooted in tradition.
Conclusion on Constitutionality
The majority concluded that neither restriction passed the Bruen test. The 30-day purchase limit and the five-day registration deadline were not supported by historical analogs and imposed undue obstacles on exercising a constitutional right. Both were struck down as violations of the Second Amendment.
Dissent: Judge Gould’s View
Judge Ronald M. Gould dissented, arguing that the laws were constitutional. He emphasized:
- Public Safety: The time limits served a legitimate state interest in preventing gun violence by ensuring timely background checks and firearm tracking.
- Historical Support: Gould pointed to early regulations—like militia inspection laws and taxes on gunpowder—as evidence of a tradition of regulating firearm acquisition and possession. He saw Hawaii’s rules as modern extensions of these practices.
- Deference to Legislature: He believed the majority was too strict in applying Bruen, effectively second-guessing reasonable state policies without giving due weight to Hawaii’s public safety goals.
Gould would have upheld both provisions, finding them consistent with historical regulation and not overly burdensome.
Outcome
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, invalidating:
- The 30-day time limit for purchasing a handgun after obtaining a permit.
- The five-day deadline for registering and inspecting a handgun in person.
The ruling was a victory for Yakutake and gun rights advocates, reinforcing that laws burdening firearm acquisition must have clear historical roots to survive Second Amendment scrutiny under Bruen. However, the slow pace of the decision—over two years after oral arguments in February 2023—underscored the court’s deliberation on this contentious issue.
COMMENTARY:
Below is a revised version of the commentary arguing that all gun control—including so-called “assault weapons” bans—is unconstitutional under the New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022) historical and tradition test, reframed without numbered paragraphs. Following that, I’ve added a section detailing how convicted felons have regained their gun rights after serving their sentences, drawing on historical practices, modern legal mechanisms, and examples tied to Yakutake v. Lopez (March 14, 2025, https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16756/21-16756-2025-03-14.html) and other relevant context.
Commentary: All Gun Control is Unconstitutional Under the Bruen Test
The Bruen historical and tradition test is the gold standard for Second Amendment challenges, tethering gun rights to the standards of 1791 when the amendment was ratified. By rooting constitutional interpretation in its original public meaning, this approach shields the right from modern judicial or legislative overreach, ensuring fidelity to the framers’ intent. It’s the right method because it demands that every gun control measure—from permits to bans—align with the regulatory framework of the Founding era, a time when such restrictions were virtually nonexistent. Under this lens, all gun control, including “assault weapons” bans, fails as unconstitutional, a principle reinforced by cases like Yakutake v. Lopez, where the Ninth Circuit struck down Hawaii’s restrictive permit deadlines for lacking historical precedent.
Bruen lays out a clear two-step process: first, it confirms whether the Second Amendment’s text—“the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”—covers the regulated conduct, then it requires the government to show the restriction matches historical tradition. In Yakutake, the court ruled that acquiring arms is part of “keep and bear,” and Hawaii’s 30-day purchase limit and five-day registration rule had no historical basis. This logic extends to all gun control. Early Americans exercised their rights freely, without permits, bans, or bureaucratic hurdles, as historical records like Saul Cornell’s A Well-Regulated Militia (2006) confirm—firearm ownership was widespread and largely unregulated beyond militia duties.
Gun control as we know it is a modern invention, clashing with the Second Amendment’s original intent. Permits, requiring citizens to seek permission for a constitutional right, reverse the Bill of Rights’ logic—imagine needing a license to speak. Yakutake found Hawaii’s permit deadlines burdensome without historical support; the permit itself fares no better, as 1791 saw no such requirements in the Statutes at Large. “Assault weapons” bans, like California’s feature-based rifle prohibitions, also collapse under Bruen. No Founding-era law banned firearms by type or capability—citizens owned advanced arms like the Girandoni air rifle, firing 20 rounds, without restriction.
Registration schemes further illustrate this disconnect. Hawaii’s five-day in-person inspection in Yakutake was struck down because colonial militia inspections applied to service, not private ownership—Bruen demands a precise analog, and none exists. Background checks, tied to permits, fail too; no 18th-century law mandated pre-purchase vetting. Yakutake noted Hawaii couldn’t justify its 30-day “staleness” claim, and historically, restrictions on dangerous individuals—like Massachusetts’ 1783 ban on “disorderly persons”—were reactive, not proactive. Waiting periods, such as California’s 10-day delay, lack any 1791 counterpart—farmers bought rifles and took them home same-day.
Concealed carry restrictions, open carry bans, and magazine limits follow suit. Bruen invalidated New York’s discretionary concealed carry permits for lacking historical grounding—early Americans carried freely, openly or concealed. Yakutake’s logic applies: if purchase deadlines fail, so do carry permits. Open carry was unrestricted in 1791, as Michael Bellesiles’ Arming America (2000) suggests (despite data disputes), and magazine caps like California’s 10-round limit have no precedent—multi-shot weapons like the Puckle gun existed without bans. Even “shall-issue” permits, red flag laws, gun-free zones, and taxes on guns crumble under Bruen, as none align with Founding-era practices.
“Assault weapons” bans, a poster child for modern gun control, epitomize this overreach. No historical law targeted rifles for their features—militia members carried the best arms available, and private citizens followed suit. Yakutake rejected Hawaii’s vague safety rationales; assault weapons bans, born in the 20th century with laws like the 1994 Federal Assault Weapons Ban, lack any 1791 analog. The Bruen test’s specificity—requiring precise historical evidence—dooms all gun control, from permits to feature-based prohibitions, as Judge Gould’s Yakutake dissent shows: a looser “public safety” standard risks diluting rights, but history prevailed.
This aligns with the Supreme Court’s originalist shift, seen in Dobbs v. Jackson (2022)—rights reflect their historical scope. For the Second Amendment, that’s a world without gun control. Yakutake’s dismantling of Hawaii’s rules proves the test’s power: no permits, no bans, no restrictions survive without a Founding-era match. Modern gun control, from the 1934 National Firearms Act to today’s “assault weapons” bans, is a 20th-century aberration, unconstitutional under Bruen’s rigorous lens, restoring the framers’ vision of unencumbered liberty.
How Convicted Felons Have Regained Gun Rights After Serving Time
Historically, the concept of permanently stripping felons of gun rights is a modern development, not a Founding-era norm, and mechanisms have long existed for restoring those rights post-sentence. In the 18th and early 19th centuries, felons faced temporary disarmament tied to specific crimes, often as part of punishment or militia exclusion, but no blanket lifetime ban existed. For instance, colonial laws like Virginia’s 1676 disarmament of rebellious servants were case-specific and lifted once loyalty was restored—there was no perpetual prohibition akin to today’s federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Early Americans assumed rights, including gun ownership, resumed after punishment, absent evidence of ongoing danger.
Under Bruen’s historical test, this suggests felons could reclaim rights naturally post-sentence, as no tradition supports permanent disarmament for all felonies. Yakutake v. Lopez doesn’t directly address felon restoration but reinforces this by striking down Hawaii’s permit burdens—implying that post-sentence restrictions, like lifetime bans, must also find historical footing, which they lack. Modern felons, however, have regained gun rights through specific legal avenues, reflecting a patchwork of state and federal processes that sometimes echo this historical flexibility.
One key method is expungement, where a felony conviction is erased, nullifying its legal effects. Under federal law (18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)), a conviction doesn’t bar gun possession if expunged, pardoned, or civil rights are restored, unless state law explicitly says otherwise. States like North Carolina allow nonviolent felons to petition for expungement after 10 years, restoring gun rights automatically if granted—mirroring the historical absence of permanent bans. For example, a felon convicted of a Class H felony (e.g., theft) in 2000 could, by 2010, have their record cleared and legally buy a firearm, as the conviction vanishes from legal view.
Another avenue is restoration of civil rights, which can lift federal firearm disabilities. In states like Washington, felons regain voting, jury service, and office-holding rights upon completing their sentence—jail time, probation, and fines paid—triggering a Certificate of Discharge. Per Beecham v. United States (1994), this state-level restoration can negate federal gun bans under § 921(a)(20), allowing felons to possess firearms unless state law restricts it. A drug trafficking felon in King County, finishing their sentence in 2015, could reclaim gun rights by 2016 with such a certificate, assuming no state prohibition lingered.
Pardons offer a third route, historically rooted in executive clemency powers akin to colonial governors’ reprieves. In Kentucky, a felon can apply for a gubernatorial pardon five years post-sentence; if granted, gun rights return unless explicitly excluded. A 2010 robbery felon, pardoned in 2015, could legally own a gun thereafter. Federally, presidential pardons—though rare—achieve the same, as seen with some Vietnam-era draft dodgers regaining rights in the 1970s. Bruen aligns here: colonial pardons often restored full citizenship, including arms, absent a permanent ban tradition.
A federal program, the ATF Relief from Disability process under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), once allowed felons to petition for gun rights restoration. From 1985-1990, ATF processed over 22,000 applications, granting relief to about one-third—e.g., a 1987 applicant with a nonviolent fraud conviction regained rights by 1989 after proving no public safety risk. Funding cuts halted this in 1992, but it shows a modern echo of historical leniency. Yakutake’s rejection of ungrounded burdens suggests this program’s premise—that felons can reclaim rights post-sentence—fits Bruen’s lens better than blanket bans.
State-specific petitions provide another mechanism. In Indiana, felons can petition courts for restoration; a 2005 embezzlement felon, after a clean decade, might regain rights by 2015 via judicial approval. Virginia requires a governor’s civil rights restoration followed by a circuit court hearing—e.g., a 1990 felon, rights restored in 2000, could petition successfully by 2001. Yakutake’s focus on historical justification undermines lifetime bans here, as no 1791 law required such permanent exclusion post-punishment.
Post-Bruen litigation has also opened doors. In 2023, the Third Circuit briefly ruled the federal felon ban unconstitutional for a food stamp fraud convict (later vacated for Rahimi review), and the Sixth Circuit in 2024 limited it to “dangerous” felons, suggesting nonviolent offenders—like a 2010 tax evader—could reclaim rights post-sentence. These align with Yakutake’s logic: if acquisition hurdles lack history, neither do blanket post-sentence prohibitions.
Historically, felons regained arms naturally after punishment, as seen in militia reintegration post-fines or jail. Modernly, expungement, civil rights restoration, pardons, ATF relief (when active), and state petitions have restored rights—e.g., a 2005 felon hunting legally by 2015 after expungement. Bruen and Yakutake bolster this: without a 1791 tradition of permanent disarmament, all gun control, including felon bans, falters, letting felons reclaim their Second Amendment rights post-sentence through these channels.
ARTICLE:
CASE:
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-16756/21-16756-2025-03-14.html
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