A newly surfaced autobiography by a Chinese intelligence-linked figure outlines years of deliberate efforts to build influence with powerful Americans, culminating in explosive claims that a retired three-star U.S. general discussed a plan to help Beijing take control of strategically important territory. A Daily Caller News Foundation (DCNF) investigation uncovered the allegations through translations of Chinese-language materials and official government statements.
At the center of the account is Eugene Ji, a Chinese-American businessman who owns two golf courses near Louisiana’s Barksdale Air Force Base. According to Ji’s 2014 autobiography, New Circle, he cultivated a long-standing professional and personal relationship with retired Army Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré. Ji claims the relationship included gifts, shared travel, and introductions to senior Chinese officials. The book further alleges the two men explored a dramatic plan to advance China’s territorial ambitions in the East China Sea—an accusation Honoré flatly denies.
Ji writes that Honoré expressed strong views supporting China’s claim over Japan-administered Senkaku Islands. In one passage, Ji recounts asking the general’s opinion, to which Honoré allegedly responded: “Those few small islands are of course Chinese territory — why keep talking without acting? No need to consult Japan. If pigs can be raised on the islands, set up a pig farm. If tourism is possible, build dozens of houses. Sovereignty is China’s. Welcome tourists from around the world. Japanese can go too, just get a visa at the Chinese embassy in Japan, so what’s the hang-up?” Ji then adds the general’s alleged follow-up question: “Do your friends think the price is too high?”
The autobiography claims Honoré later served as the “U.S. affairs advisor” to Ji’s organization, the G2 Club, a group with operations in both China and the United States that reportedly brings together business elites and government-linked figures from both countries.
Honoré, however, forcefully rejected the accusations. He told the DCNF that Ji is “full of shit.” While acknowledging that he met with Ji on occasion, Honoré insisted there was never any formal role or agreement. “I did meet with them, but I had no agreement with them, and was no kind of official advisor,” he said. “I’ve never gotten anything out of it, never been paid anything, and it’s mostly cost me time as a courtesy to Eugene, because he’s a serial entrepreneur and I do consulting work.”
Despite the denial, the length of their association has drawn scrutiny. Ji has held multiple roles tied to the Chinese government, including positions connected to the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a Chinese Communist Party entity known for influence and intelligence operations abroad. Former Air Force intelligence analyst L.J. Eads said the claims raise serious counterintelligence concerns.
“What makes this especially concerning is that a documented United Front–affiliated actor openly describes influencing senior U.S. military officers and elected officials, getting meetings arranged, access granted, projects discussed, and relationships leveraged,” Eads told the DCNF. “When a foreign political influence system is able to shape behavior, decisions, or access among generals and politicians through informal business and social channels, that crosses from engagement into a national security vulnerability.”
Ji’s book goes further, describing a plan to assert Chinese control over the Senkaku Islands by disguising the move as a commercial development. According to the autobiography, prefabricated Chinese structures would be shipped to the islands to create a resort, staffed in part by “100 black people” recruited from a U.S. civil rights organization to discourage American intervention during the Obama administration.
Ji explains the rationale bluntly: “[W]e would also hire the American black civil rights Martin Luther King organization to organize 100 black people to provide security and hotel services for Chinese tourists. The U.S. government wouldn’t dare interfere — this is private commercial cooperation. Black civil rights organizations helped Obama get into the White House.” He then adds, “What the government can’t do, we the people will handle.”
The Senkaku Islands are currently administered by Japan and are widely recognized as strategically significant to U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. Ji claims he repeatedly pitched the estimated $500 million project to Chinese political insiders, proposing that Chinese state-backed loans would finance the housing units, which would then be escorted to the islands, followed by the raising of China’s flag and the imposition of Chinese visa controls.
There is no evidence the plan advanced beyond discussions. Honoré dismissed the entire account, telling the DCNF, “All that’s lies.”
Ji also alleges that discussions related to the scheme took place after rounds of golf at one of his courses. He further claims they helped organize a “Sino-U.S. Generals’ Friendly Golf Tournament,” which allegedly brought Chinese military officers to the United States and included visits to a B-52 bomber training base.
“Every year, the club invites 50 Chinese military personnel to visit the U.S., make friends with U.S. military personnel, play golf and increase mutual understanding,” Ji wrote. “The G2 Club specially invited three-star First Army General Russel Honoré and other senior U.S. military officers to participate in the club’s golf-themed annual meeting, tour a U.S. B-52 bomber training base, visit General Chennault’s military museum, and revisit the history of the Flying Tigers’ assistance to China during World War II to promote friendly exchanges between the two militaries.”
Honoré strongly rejected this claim as well. “It’s all fabricated shit,” he said, adding, “I hate fucking golf. I live on a golf course. I’ve been on it one fucking time since 2010.”
Barksdale Air Force Base declined to confirm or deny whether such visits occurred, stating, “[W]e do not discuss specific intelligence, investigative matters, or alleged interactions involving individual personnel.”
China expert Gordon Chang argued that the allegations expose broader failures in U.S. military security. “The Air Force in particular and the Pentagon in general need to stop being oblivious,” Chang said. “We’ve known about China’s infiltration of areas around military bases and done little or nothing about it. What is wrong with us?” He added, “The Department of War should take its name seriously. China thinks it is at war with us, so, yes, we’re at war.”
Ji’s autobiography also describes gifting Honoré luxury items, including expensive Chinese liquor and LED lighting for his home. Ji claims they frequently drank Moutai together and recounts giving Honoré a bottle costing more than $400 at a New Orleans dinner, as well as an entire case sourced directly from the distillery.
“Whenever I return to China, if I have the time, I make a special trip to Guizhou,” Ji wrote. “Last time, Mr. Hu managed to obtain an entire case directly from the Moutai distillery. The general took it back to Washington D.C., where more than 10 generals finished it all in one sitting.”
Honoré said he did not recall receiving such gifts and disputed the account. “I got LED lights and a globe from him, never any boxes of expensive liquor,” he said. “He gave me a globe, I’ve got the globe in my office, it’s one you can buy out of any Amazon shop.”
Ji also claims he replaced all the lighting in Honoré’s home with Chinese-made LED products. “I had a friend deliver three boxes and replace all the lighting in the general’s villa with ‘Made in China’ products that had American UL certification,” Ji wrote, adding that the general later asked him to introduce the lights to military bases—another claim Honoré denies.
Business records reviewed by the DCNF indicate that the LED company involved is closely tied to Ji himself, raising additional concerns. Eads said such activity crosses a dangerous line.
“When a foreign political intermediary supplies luxury goods and installs electronic systems inside the home of a senior U.S. military official without clear disclosure or vetting, that is not just a social courtesy,” Eads warned. “It is a counterintelligence concern.”
COMMENTARY:
What this report describes should alarm every American, regardless of party or ideology, because it exposes how vulnerable the United States can become when foreign influence is allowed to operate unchecked around our military, political leadership, and critical infrastructure.
First and foremost, the allegations point to a systematic effort by individuals tied to the Chinese Communist Party’s influence and intelligence apparatus to cultivate personal relationships with senior U.S. military figures. Even if every claim in the autobiography were exaggerated or false, the fact that a CCP-linked actor felt comfortable boasting about influencing American generals should be deeply troubling. Deterrence fails the moment an adversary believes it can manipulate U.S. decision-makers through informal relationships, favors, or access rather than through legitimate diplomatic channels.
Second, the proximity of this relationship to Barksdale Air Force Base raises serious national security red flags. Barksdale is not just another installation; it is a strategic nuclear bomber base that plays a central role in America’s deterrence posture. Any sustained foreign-linked activity around such a base—especially by individuals with documented ties to United Front influence operations—represents a potential intelligence risk. The United States cannot afford complacency when adversaries openly target areas surrounding sensitive military assets.
The alleged discussions surrounding the Senkaku Islands illustrate how influence operations can blur into strategic sabotage. The islands are critical to U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with Japan. Even informal conversations or hypothetical schemes that normalize the idea of undermining allied sovereignty weaken America’s credibility abroad. If U.S. adversaries can convince themselves that American military leaders privately support their territorial ambitions, it erodes deterrence and emboldens aggression.
Equally damaging is the pattern of gift-giving and personal favors described in the report. Whether it is luxury alcohol, home renovations, or business introductions, such conduct creates conflicts of interest and potential leverage. Influence does not always require envelopes of cash; it thrives on reciprocity, obligation, and blurred ethical boundaries. For a foreign-linked intermediary to install electronic equipment inside the home of a senior U.S. military official should concern anyone who understands counterintelligence basics.
This case also highlights a broader institutional failure. The United Front Work Department’s methods are well-documented, yet the U.S. military and federal agencies appear slow to treat these activities with the seriousness they demand. When influence campaigns are dismissed as harmless business networking or cultural exchange, adversaries gain ground without firing a shot. As one expert noted, this crosses from engagement into a national security vulnerability.
Finally, the damage goes beyond intelligence risks—it strikes at public trust. Americans expect their generals and officials to operate with unquestionable loyalty and judgment. Even the appearance of compromised relationships undermines confidence in the institutions charged with defending the nation. Adversaries exploit that erosion of trust to weaken the United States from within.
In the end, this story is not just about one businessman or one retired general. It is a warning about how modern warfare works. China does not need tanks on American soil to challenge U.S. power; it needs access, influence, and complacency. If the United States fails to recognize and aggressively counter these tactics, it risks losing strategic ground without ever realizing a battle has begun.
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